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Monetary Policy after the Great 
Moderation1
Abstract: The interferences among some financial, economic and 
monetary variables are checked as an indicator of economic perfor-
mance in the long run and for the monetary policy applied between 
the Great Moderation (GM) of 1987-2001 and the Global Financial 
Crisis of 2007-2009. For achieving this target, some Granger causal-
ity tests are applied to GDP growth, credit growth, and lending in-
terest of 36 countries of the EU and the OECD for the full sample of 
1987-2012 and the sub-sample of 2002-2007. Results corroborate the 
interferences among these variables for the discretionary monetary 
policy applied immediately after the GM, within the “Ad Hoc Era” or 
“lax period”, and independence when monetary policy was correctly 
applied and rules-based.
Key words: Monetary policy, Economic growth, Financial crises, 
Great Moderation, Central Banking
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1. Introduction1
It is well-known, the usual first aim of monetary policy is the stabilization of 
prices (Federal Reserve in the USA and European Central Bank in the EU), in ad-
dition to other issues such as economic growth (explicitly in the Federal Reserve). 
There are several reasons for that, but one of them is explained by the words of 
Milton Friedman (1970):
1 Acknowledgments: The author expresses his gratitude for the funding received from the Re-
gional Government of Aragon European Social Fund and the European Regional Development 
Fund (Public Economics Research Group).
6 Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice
“Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon in the sense that it 
is and can be produced only by a more rapid increase in the quantity of money 
than in output.”
As this quotation suggests, there would be no inflation if the quantity of money 
grew at the same rate as output, allowing a country to benefit from economic 
stability. In a case as this, in which output, money and prices grow at a particular 
growth rate, monetary policy would exert no impact on real/economic (output) 
and financial (prices) growth. This fact is related to the Quantitative Theory of 
Money (QTM), which states that, if the velocity of money is constant and there 
is no economic growth, then the inflation rate equals the growth rate of money2.
Previous to the Volker disinflation in the USA (which occurred during 1980-
1985), there was high inflation of 9% but monetary policy was restrictive (Good-
friend and King, 2005). Nonetheless, it is arguable that there were at least two re-
cessions in that period, and then the quantity of money could have decreased less 
than output. Avoiding this discussion, in this paper we try to analyze whether 
financial variables as credit (instead of inflation) and economic variables as GDP 
are influenced by monetary policy, and the influence of monetary policy on the 
interaction between economic and financial variables. 
So, another main question in this paper is to check whether economic growth 
has been at any time the target of central banks, and therefore, whether inflation 
has always been the lonely target of monetary policy, in addition to whether it 
should be so. Therefore, two recent periods of monetary policy and its causality 
on financial (lending) and real (GDP growth), and the causality between the last 
two are compared in this paper. First, the period from the beginning of the Great 
Moderation (GM) from 1987 to 2012 is analysed, and second, the period imme-
diately after the GM, considered the lax period from 2002 to 2007 in which no 
correct monetary policies were followed (Peña, 2017a and Taylor, 2009) and this 
encouraged the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009 and, after that, the 
Great Recession (GR). Lee and Werner (2018) have highlighted the importance of 
quantities in monetary policy and shown evidence about the non-impact of mon-
etary policy in real terms (output) since the GM. Nonetheless, we consider that it 
could be a differentiate effect on the application of the not ruled-based monetary 
policy from the previous years to the GFC. So, the main contribution of this 
paper is considering separately the lax period between the GM and the GFC to 
study if monetary policy Granger-causes economic or financial fluctuations. 
2 http://www.caixabankresearch.com/documents/10180/1148227/38-39%2BDossiers%2B4%2BING.
pdf 
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Hence, we beg the following questions: is the interest rate independent from real 
and financial variables as GDP and loan credit growth in the long term? Is there 
any difference in the previous answer if the monetary policy is not ruled-based, 
as occurred immediately after the GM? In the long term, was there any inde-
pendence between those financial and economic variables? And finally, do these 
results change if a discretionary monetary policy is applied, as in the lax period?
To answer these questions following this introduction, the paper is divided as fol-
lows. The second section shows the theoretical view and literature review on the 
topic. The third section exposes the methodology, data and results of the paper, 
while the fourth section discusses the results and contributes policy measures. 
Finally, fifth section provides the conclusions and further research.
2. Theoretical view and literature review
As the 2018 Nobel Laureate Paul Romer (2016) suggests, Milton Friedman and 
Anna Schwartz considered that monetary policy impacted on GDP during the 
Great Depression of 1929. In this paper we show that when monetary policy is 
correctly applied (following rules as Taylor’s, taking inflation and GDP into ac-
count accurately), then money does not cause output shifts, whilst if the monetary 
policy is incorrectly applied (in a discretionary way or with incorrect monetary 
rules, as taking only inflation into account or following non-economic criteria), 
money causes output shifts. In order to check this result and taking into account 
the monetary policy established by many central bankers mainly since 2001, the 
paper estimates whether lending amounts Granger-cause lending interest (as in-
dicator of a target of monetary policy) and whether lending interest Granger-
cause GDP growth, differentiating between 1987-2012 and the lax period after 
GM (2002-2007). By this way, it can be checked if the lax monetary policy of 
2000s influenced interests and if interests influenced the output just before the 
GR. This time division is related to the two eras exposed by Taylor (2012), differ-
entiating between the “Rules-Based Era”, from 1985-2003, when central bankers 
followed a predictable systemic approach, with a good economic performance; 
and the “Ad Hoc Era”, when monetary policy is settled according to the “discre-
tion of authorities”, developing a poor economic performance.
Some authors as Romer (2016), consider that, currently, there is a relevant impor-
tance on the non-economic performance of maybe not so relevant psychological 
aspects on monetary policy such as the communication and way of speaking of 
central bankers, the “imaginary shocks”, or the extended belief in Dynamic Sto-
chastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models that future monetary policies can-
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not be predicted because each new monetary shock requires new models, think-
ing and policies.
Turning back to Friedman’s thinking (Friedman, 1968, 1970, 1977), he consid-
ered that real economy should be independent, as he believed in the existence 
of a natural rate of inflation and a rate of unemployment (similar to the NAIRU 
or “Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment”) independent from in-
flation in same ideal cases. In spite of that, some authors consider that if there 
is a failure of this independence hypothesis, there is a more attractive trade-off 
between output and inflation, strengthening the role of the monetary policy. For 
instance, Blanchard (2018) suggests central bankers to allow output to exceed 
for some time. Nonetheless, Peña (2017b) finds a significant correlation between 
economic (unemployment) and financial (credit loans) variables only when mon-
etary policy is not rules-based (immediately before the GR, during the lax pe-
riod), sustaining the need of the independence hypothesis for a good economic 
performance.
Lee and Werner (2018) found that rates of interest from monetary policy do not 
Granger-cause economic growth in general for the period 1957Q1-2008Q4 for 3 
of 4 developed countries (UK, US and Japan, with the exception of Germany). On 
the other hand, other findings are that the nominal GDP growth is highly and 
positively correlated with, and Granger-causes interest rates in all four countries. 
Therefore, we consider this as an argument for supporting the no causality and 
independency of the impacts of monetary policy on the real economy measured 
by GDP. According to this, what is the difference for central bankers in maintain-
ing lower or higher interest rates for the economy? None. Nonetheless, monetary 
policy is necessary to control three main aspects: correct rules-based monetary 
policy, correct regulation, and correct banking performance. Some previous arti-
cles have explored the relevance of monetary policy on these three aspects. First, 
the relevance of rules-based monetary policy on credit booms and crises (Taylor, 
2007 and 2012, and Peña 2017a) is remarkable. Second, the importance of mon-
etary policy on real economy and the role of the banking regulation, studying the 
relationship between unemployment and financial value added previously, dur-
ing and after the Great Moderation (Peña, 2017b). Finally, some papers consider 
the relevance of banking efficiency (Peña, 2019).
According to Taylor (2007) and Peña (2017a), good monetary policy performance 
in the early 1980s, considered as the Great Moderation (GM), was followed by 
a period in which Taylor rule was not followed by most central bankers at least 
since 2001 to 2006. This facilitated a lending boom that is related with the hous-
ing boom previous to the GFC. Peña (2017b) observed a different behaviour be-
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fore and after the GM respect to the GM years in the correlation between un-
employment and credit loans. In fact, during the GM there was no significant 
effect between both variables, in contrast to the other periods. This article also 
wonders about the much expectancy that some central bankers have deposited 
on the banking regulations considering, as Vassiliadis et al. (2012), that this tool 
is not the panacea. Indeed, there is an important pressure in banking profitability 
by adapting capital to the new guidelines of Basel III. Finally, Peña (2019) analy-
ses a period at the end and after the GM, concretely the period between 1996 and 
2014, and he found a significant correlation between unemployment and banking 
costs in a non-linear relationship. The contribution of this paper is considering 
the periods from Taylor (2007), Peña (2017a) and Peña (2017b), but applied for 
the question of Lee and Werner (2018) about the causality of monetary policy on 
GDP (and, in addition, its causality on credit and the causality between GDP and 
credit) to shed more light on the proposition of Friedman (1970) exposed at the 
introduction.
We sustain the hypothesis of the existence of several optimal constants on the 
equilibrium in the long run, i.e.: real economic growth, inflation, rate of unem-
ployment (or NAIRU), and money growth, and therefore, if monetary policy is 
correctly applied, the observed rates could tend to these optima and there will be 
no causality relationship between money and real and financial variables. Other-
wise, official interest rates of central banks would Granger-cause real and finan-
cial variables as GDP growth or lending.
So, literature has pointed to at least three independent theoretical constants. First, 
the natural rate of unemployment. Friedman suggested the existence of a natural 
rate of unemployment, whilst Tobin qualified it as NAIRU. According to Fried-
man (1968, p.8), “At any moment of time, there is some level of unemployment 
which has the property that it is consistent with equilibrium in the structure of 
real wages”. Second, according to Friedman (1960), “The stock of money [should 
be] increased at a fixed rate year-in and year-out without any variation in the rate 
of increase to meet cyclical needs", proposing the k-rule of Friedman. A variation 
from this proposal is the Taylor’s rule explained above. Finally, Friedman and 
other authors considered an ideal constant inflation rate; a 2% target of inflation 
rate is applied by the European Central Bank, for instance.
Therefore, inflation would be independent from output if a rules-based monetary 
policy was applied, a target of interest rate taking into account both variables. 
In the long-term, both would be constants (and hence, independent), according 
to the natural rates of unemployment and inflation, and therefore, the interest 
rate should also be independent for avoiding interferences, for this reason Fried-
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man suggested the k-rule (a constant growth of the monetary base). On the other 
hand, the real and financial economies should also grow without interferences. 
Nonetheless, there are usually interferences that turn monetary policy as neces-
sary, and also its sterilization. 
According to the theoretical views of this section, we can affirmatively answer to 
the four questions of the introduction. Let’s see if the empirical results corrobo-
rate these theoretical expectations.
3. Data, methodology and results
This paper has employed data from the World Bank Database, including three 
variables from a dataset of 36 countries of the European Union and the OECD 
for the periods 1987-2012 (full sample) and 2002-2007 (period of lax monetary 
policy in most countries). In order to check the interdependence and effects of 
monetary policy on financial and economic variables in the full sample and in 
the lax period, there is an analysis of the effects of the lending interest rates (int, 
as indicator of monetary policy target) on credit loan growth (dlnc, measured as 
the differences in the logarithm of the private credit loans provided by the finan-
cial sector), and on the economic growth (gdpgr, annual growth rate of the GDP). 
The way employed in this paper for testing these facts is studying the Granger-
causality of monetary policy on these two variables and vice-versa, for checking 
what variable causes each other if there is any interdependence. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics (number of observations, mean, standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum) for the three variables.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
dlnc 1504 10.73 16.85 -160.74 130.06
gdpgr 1587 3.44 3.78 -32.12 21.83
int 1032 16.41 47.63 0.50 824.56
Table 2 summarizes Tables 3 to 8 (see Appendix), which show the results. These 
tables show the p-value and the rejection (1) or not rejection (0) of the null hy-
pothesis applied for each country. The data relevant for analysis will be the per-
centage of countries in which the null hypothesis is rejected (the average of rejec-
tions) and the average p-value for each sample of countries.
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Table 2: Summary of results
Period p-value reject, 1, or not reject, 0 p-value reject, 1, or not reject, 0 At least one 
hypothesis 
rejectedTables 3 and 4 Dependent: dlnc, independent: int Dependent: int, independent: dlnc
1987-2012 0.363 0.29411765 0.32791176 0.44117647 0.58823529
2002-2007 0.10395455 0.63636364 0.04959091 0.86363636 0.95454545
Tables 5 and 6 Dependent: gdpgr. independent: int Dependent: int. independent: gdpgr
1987-2012 0.24502941 0.44117647 0.15944118 0.55882353 0.76470588
2002-2007 0.01730435 0.95652174 0.12434783 0.60869565 1
Tables 7 and 8 Dependent: gdpgr. independent: dlnc Dependent: dlnc. independent: gdpgr
1987-2012 0.44066667 0.27777778 0.43561111 0.11111111 0.36111111
2002-2007 0.17814706 0.70588235 0.11482353 0.79411765 0.97058824
In Table 3 we can observe that the null hypotheses that int does not cause dlnc 
or dlnc Granger-causes int for the full sample are rejected in 29% and 44% of the 
countries, respectively, while the average p-value for all the countries is 0.33 and 
0.36. On the other hand, as Table 4 exposes, for the sub-sample between 2002 and 
2007 the results show that the null hypotheses were rejected in a 64% and 83% of 
the countries, respectively. The average p-value for the null hypotheses that int 
does not cause dlnc was 0.10, and 0.05 for the opposite causality. Furthermore, if 
we check if there is any kind of causality between both variables, in the 95% of the 
countries there is at least one rejection of any of the two null hypotheses. 
The explanation could be that there is evidence for the non-interdependence be-
tween economic and monetary variables for the period between 1987 and 2012, 
while there is evidence that the lending interest Granger-causes the economic 
growth rate for the lax period of 2002-20073. 
Table 5 shows the results for the full sample. It is shown that only for the 44% of 
the countries the null hypothesis that the variable int does not Granger-cause the 
variable gdpgr is rejected, while for the 55% of the countries the null hypothesis 
is rejected for the opposite Granger-causality. The average p-value of the former 
causality is 24.5%, but 16% for the latter. In Table 6, the results for the sub-sample 
are exposed. The percentage of countries in which the former null hypothesis is 
rejected achieves the 96%, while the percentage for the latter achieves the 61%. 
3 This period has been chosen as “lax period” instead of 2002-2006 for two reasons: first, this al-
lowed to analyze a weaker sample and many countries obtained no result due to bad economet-
ric properties, and second, we have chosen to incorporate 2007 because it is the year in which 
the GFC started.
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The average p-value for all countries in the period between 2002 and 2007 (lax 
period) is 0.02 for the former hypothesis and 0.12 for the latter.
This means that price instruments of monetary policy (interest rates) did not 
cause economic variables as nominal GDP growth, as Lee and Werner (2018) ob-
tained for 3 of 4 developed countries for the full sample between 1950 and 2008 
(before the Quantitative Easing, QE). In fact, they observe that the “monetary 
mantra” as they refer to the traditional belief by central bankers that lower rates 
cause a higher rate of economic growth, is the opposite in two dimensions, corre-
lation and causation, allowing them to state that higher economic growth leads to 
higher interest rates. This paper corroborates that the “monetary mantra” could 
be false for the full sample, but may be not for the period previous to the GFC. 
Furthermore, this paper finds a new result: the interdependence and causality be-
tween some monetary and financial variables during the period of lax monetary 
policy between 2002 and 2007, but not for the GM. For this period, the monetary 
mantra that monetary policy measured by lending interest rates affects economic 
growth is corroborated. Nonetheless, the sign of the relationship is not neces-
sary to be negative between interest rates and economic growth. As Peña (2017a) 
empirically observes, this relationship is negative for the period of the GR in the 
euro area but not in some other periods. In fact, and based on the empirical find-
ings of Heider, Saidi and Schepens (2018), Brunnermeier and Koby (2019) explain 
the existence of a “reversal rate”, an interest rate under which monetary policy 
effects are the opposite of traditionally expected. In this case, lower interest rates 
could lead to lower economic growth.
Table 7 shows the findings for the full sample on variables lnc and gdpgr. Only 
for the 36% of the countries at least one of the null hypotheses that the variable 
lnc does not Granger-cause the variable gdpgr or the Granger-causality in the op-
posite direction is rejected. The results for the sub-sample are exposed in Table 
8, when in the 97% of the countries at least one of the former null hypotheses is 
rejected.
There is non-interdependence between economic and financial variables for the 
full sample period, when rules-based monetary policy were applied, while there 
is some causality between financial and economic variables for the period after 
the GM. 
Therefore, according to Taylor (2007), during the Great Moderation (1987-2001), 
there were independent relationships among financial, economic and monetary 
variables in a period when the monetary policy was correctly applied. Nonethe-
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less, the period in which lax monetary policies were applied in most countries, 
there was also evidence that in most advanced countries the monetary policy 
Granger-caused financial and economic variables. The four questions of the in-
troduction are also positively answered by the empirical findings.
4. Discussion
The period of the Great Moderation, in which a correct monetary policy was ap-
plied according to the Taylor rule (Taylor, 2007), there is no causality between 
monetary and financial or economic variables according to the results of the pre-
vious section. This is in line with the results of Lee and Werner (2018) who ob-
tained non-significance of the Granger causality of interests on economic growth 
for 3 of 4 countries. It suggests that predictions of Friedman relative to the natu-
ral constants are in force only when monetary policy is correctly applied accord-
ing to financial (inflation) and economic (GDP) indicators. This period led to the 
longest period of financial stability.
In the period in which lax monetary policy was applied, that monetary policy 
caused financial and economic variables. Concretely, as our results show, mon-
etary policy caused credit growth, and therefore, unchained the credit boom 
which led to the sub-prime crisis that originated the GFC. On the other hand, 
monetary policy also caused an excessive economic growth that led to a growth 
rate of GDP higher than the potential and encouraged the GR, helped by the in-
terdependence between financial and economic variables of that period. Further-
more, the role of monetary policy could influence the interference and causality 
among financial, economic and monetary variables.
Some authors advocated fora sheer luck as an explanation for the financial stabil-
ity during the GM (Canova and Gambetti, 2005; Gambetti, Pappa and Canova, 
2008 and Sims and Zha, 2006) or the inconsistency of the former hypothesis and 
the doubtlessness about the good policy (Benati and Surico, 2009). Nonetheless, 
authors as Taylor (2009) have corroborated the good policy as the correct expla-
nation (Lubik and Schorfheide, 2004; Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1999), due to the 
effects of the lax monetary policy of the after-GM-period, which led to financial 
instability of the GFC and the GR. 
This article shows the evidence that, in the long run and when there is financial 
stability (GM), there is no interdependence between monetary, financial and eco-
nomic variables, while with financial instability (lax period between GM and 
GFC of 2007-2009) it is observed (based on the results of this paper) that monetary 
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policy Granger-causes economic and financial variables, and there is a relevant 
causality in any direction between economic and financial variables. Therefore, 
maybe there was no good policy during the GM but good luck or other factors; 
nonetheless, this would be surprising taking into account the results obtained 
that in the lax period, when there were no good monetary policies according to 
Taylor (2009), monetary policy caused interferences in loan credit and GDP im-
mediately before the GFC and GR. We can state that monetary policy was not 
rules-based but discretional, without following neutrality on the QTM equation, 
affecting the velocity of money and, therefore, causing financial instability.
As Lehtimäki and Palmu (2019) suggest, in addition to, or instead of output gap 
and inflation variables, under uncertain economic conditions, as in the period 
2007-2010, communication and transparency tools are broadly used by central 
bankers, facilitating their predictability. Furthermore, and corroborating the re-
sults of this paper, Jansen and De Haan (2009) study whether the communica-
tion was an explanatory variable for the monetary policy of the initial period of 
the European Monetary Union (EMU), from 1999 to 2002 (part of the GM in 
this paper). They observe that the key explanatory variables were only macroeco-
nomic indicators related to inflation and output. On the other hand, Hayo and 
Neuenkirch (2010) compared the predictability of Taylor rule and communica-
tion in the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve during 1998-2006, finding 
more predictability on communication conventions than in Jansen and De Haan 
for the ECB. This period includes the “Ad Hoc Era” previous to the GFC. This 
era could be continuing even nowadays, when policy measures are ad hoc, some-
times driven by random, political and short-run shocks, as current tensions in 
international trade, rather than long-run macroeconomic variables. Even more, 
these policies are usually settled before the opportune moment, if there is any, 
according to macroeconomic indicators, and using the well-known communica-
tion tools for that.
The use of these tools, helped by new technologies, is a way of achieving cred-
ibility, but it reduces the policy relevance of other more important variables in 
the central banking practice as the economic interactions. Lehtimäki and Palmu 
(2019) state that, according to the empirical evidence, effective communication 
enables market shifts. Nonetheless, what happens if communication worsens fi-
nancial stability? For instance, markets could predict a wrong monetary policy, 
and this could be even worse for the economy. Communication and non-conven-
tional policy might only be a tool for applying rules-based policies, not a target 
itself. According to Praščević and Ješić (2019), central bankers have to follow ac-
curate monetary policies in order to achieve the stabilization of inflation and 
output, but a precondition to this is a credible policy-making, which could miti-
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gate negative consequences of the recent very low interest rates. For the sake of 
financial stability, fiscal policy can be also used (Dumičić, 2019). 
Currently, the Quantitative Easing (QE) and non-conventional monetary policy 
may also lead to a credit boom. But in this case the bubble would not come from 
households due to sub-prime mortgages; in this case there may be a boom of cor-
porate bonds, overall in the USA. This could lead to another crisis. An interesting 
further research would be the study of the Granger-causality of monetary poli-
cies of the analysed countries for the current period of 2008-2019. 
Furthermore, current regulatory frameworks as Basel III consider that the origin 
of the next crisis could not be predicted, being originated by a previously non-
seen shock (wait-and-see approach). Therefore, it has been extended that each cri-
sis̀  needs from economic policies differ from the previous ones, as DSGE models 
sustain. Nonetheless, in this paper we think that there are similar shadow reasons 
that could lead to the same crises, but with different faces. In fact, the more the 
regulated the banks are, it does not mean the less probability of a crisis. There are 
like three pillars for the avoidance of banking crises: correct monetary policy, 
correct regulation, and correct banking performance. With any one of these pil-
lars missing, a banking crisis becomes more probable. If banks are overregulated, 
they would be forced to hold more capital, which could lead them to lower profit-
ability, and therefore, less capital available for them because of being less attrac-
tive for investors, thus creating a vicious circle. 
Finally, we consider that the good performance during the GM was due to the 
following of rules-based monetary policy by central bankers, which settled of-
ficial interest rates similar to the market ones by an activist approach, allow-
ing non-interferences among the main economic variables and monetary policy. 
Nonetheless, the current discretionary monetary policy (after GM) based on a 
wait-and-see approach leads to differences in the official and market interest 
rates, provoking interferences and causalities among economic, financial and 
monetary variables, which lead to the current poor economic performance.
While some authors as Blanchard (2018) suggest that the independent hypoth-
esis, and, therefore, the natural rate hypothesis has currently failed, we have ob-
served that this failure is generated only when central bankers fail to apply ac-
curate rules-based policies (as observed during the lax period in this paper), we 
have uncertainty and incorrect interferences. But this does not avoid the possible 
existence of a natural rate only observed in ideal cases, as Friedman suggested. 
In fact, some natural rates could explain what our data reflect: the absence of 
causality of monetary, real and financial variables in some ideal cases as the GM 
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in which monetary policy was rules-based following the main macroeconomic 
variables, i.e. output and inflation. 
Despite Blanchard (2018) effectively suggesting the inexistence of the natural rate 
hypothesis according to his evidence, he also states that it is not conclusive evi-
dence. Nonetheless, he also suggests that the decrease in economic output rela-
tive to the trend could reflect a decrease in the potential trend, or could reflect 
persistent and strong economic effects of the GFC on the supply of the economy. 
These effects could be considered hysteretic consequences of lower economic ac-
tivity perpetuating itself. Blanchard and Summers (1986) provide hysteresis as 
an explanation for other economic crises, referring that changes in the natural 
rate could be path-dependent, as Phelps (1972) proposed. Finally, Blanchard con-
cludes that, if so, the monetary policy shocks might have no effect on GCF. 
Moreover, and regarding to the Lucas (1976) critique of the Phillips curve, Blan-
chard (2018) suggests that expectations matter and the trade-off between infla-
tion and economic activity could disappear if circumstances change or the poli-
cymakers exploit it. Handler (1987), in contrast, observed two relevant facts: first, 
real sector is sometimes a function of the inflation rate, which is determined by 
monetary policy. Second, he finds an “inverse Phillips curve” in which unantici-
pated inflation stimulates real activity with some delay, but anticipated usually 
dampens real activity development. Nevertheless, some authors found a lower 
and less significant coefficient of the relationship between unemployment and 
inflation since the mid-1990s (Blanchard, Cerutti, and Summers 2015; Miles, 
Panizza, Reis, and Ubide 2017), but, according to Blanchard, the effect of unem-
ployment on wages remains positive yet smaller. The reason of why it is smaller 
“remains largely mysterious” to him. According to our findings, monetary policy 
matters and a rule-based policy could be the reason for the decrease of this coef-
ficient during the GM. So, monetary policy matters, but not only for the expecta-
tions of the markets, which is supplementary, if not prejudicial, but for monetary 
management itself, in which a rule-based monetary policy could lead to less un-
certain due to the avoidance of interferences among economic variables and to a 
corroboration of the natural rate hypothesis. 
As seen before, some authors suggest the existence of a reversal rate, which could 
be positive and may be related with the k-rule of Friedman. This could be a nat-
ural rate, the optimal interest rate for an economy, keeping constant on time 
and being positive instead of zero. The reason is that Friedman considered the 
zero-rate as the lowest bound for interest rates, and current monetary policies 
have shown the existence of negative interest rates. It is worth mentioning that 
these ad hoc policies, QE, and negative interests lead to other economic distur-
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bances. As an example, low interest rates for credit and bonds enable inefficient 
businesses to survive, and the longer the central bankers prorogue this ineffi-
cient cycle and its possible bubbles, the deeper the next financial crisis will be. 
Other implications from this kind of policies exceed the mere economic effects 
and could affect social, demographic and cultural behaviours. For instance, lax 
policies lead to seeking for higher profitability on risky, illiquid, and long-run as-
sets more than others cheaper assets as money, due to the excess of liquidity. In 
the case of a government, investors could even prefer short-run terms of public 
debt rather than the long-run, leading to the well-known inverted yield curve in 
the bond market. Regarding to the households, more expensive illiquid assets 
provoke higher prices at the real-estate market, and therefore, sometimes dis-
couragements to emancipate and form a family, with the consequent loss in the 
vegetative balance due to a decrease in the population growth rate. 
5. Conclusions and further research
Recently, Lee and Werner (2018) suggested that official interest rates of mone-
tary policy do not cause economic growth, in contrast to many other authors̀  
expectations for the period between 1950 and 2008. Nonetheless, they do not 
consider the differences in the two eras of economic performance differentiated 
on the approach established to settle monetary policy according to Taylor (2012), 
concretely, the Great Moderation (GM) and the period immediately after that. 
This paper uses a sample of 36 countries of the EU and the OECD and applies 
Granger-causality among economic (GDP growth), financial (loan credits) and 
monetary (lending interests) variables in order to check if the above-mentioned 
absence of causality is corroborated when the period immediately after the GM 
is considered. The results show that when the discretionary monetary policy after 
the GM was applied (2002-2007), there were interferences among economic, fi-
nancial and monetary variables, while there were no interdependence during the 
whole period (1987-2012), including the GM period. These interferences could 
explain the credit boom previous to the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 and 
the subsequent Great Recession. Repeating the same mistakes as in the “Ad Hoc 
Era” could lead to another financial crisis.
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Appendix






Country p-value reject? p-value reject? At least one reject
Australia 0.43 0 0.149 0 0
Austria 0.021 1 0.948 0 1
Bulgaria 0 1 0.087 1 1
Canada 0.72 0 0.929 0 0
Chile 0.169 0 0.449 0 0
Czech Republic 0.029 1 0.221 0 1
Denmark 0.443 0 0.554 0 0
Estonia 0.834 0 0.018 1 1
Finland 0.203 0 0.043 1 1
France 0.953 0 0.819 0 0
Germany 0.624 0 0.115 0 0
Greece 0.267 0 0.146 0 0
Hungary 0.333 0 0.047 1 1
Ireland 0.003 1 0.95 0 1
Iceland 0.406 0 0.004 1 1
Israel 0.698 0 0.727 0 0
Italy 0.703 0 0.826 0 0
Japan 0.147 0 0.014 1 1
Korea 0.216 0 0.228 0 0
Luxembourg 0.117 0 0.036 1 1
Latvia 0.08 1 0.008 1 1
Mexico 0.061 1 0 1 1
Lithuania 0.37 0 0.015 1 1
Netherlands 0.649 0 0.452 0 0
New Zealand 0.004 1 0.698 0 1
Norway 0.359 0 0.423 0 0
Poland 0.01 1 0.603 0 1
Portugal 0.036 1 0.042 1 1
Slovak Republic 0.022 1 0.002 1 1
Slovenia 0.748 0 0.668 0 0
Spain 0.772 0 0.009 1 1
Sweden 0.637 0 0.864 0 0
United Kingdom 0.672 0 0.03 1 1
United States 0.606 0 0.025 1 1
Average 0.363 0.29411765 0.32791176 0.44117647 0.58823529
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Country p-value reject? p-value reject? At least one reject
Australia 0 1 0 1 1
Belgium 0.669 0 0.273 0 0
Bulgaria 0.113 0 0 1 1
Canada 0 1 0 1 1
Chile 0 1 0.002 1 1
Czech Republic 0.31 0 0 1 1
Estonia 0 1 0 1 1
Hungary 0 1 0.557 0 1
Iceland 0.005 1 0 1 1
Israel 0.005 1 0.017 1 1
Italy 0.32 0 0 1 1
Japan 0 1 0 1 1
Korea 0.119 0 0 1 1
Latvia 0.181 0 0.002 1 1
Mexico 0.001 1 0.014 1 1
Lithuania 0.272 0 0 1 1
Netherlands 0.292 0 0 1 1
New Zealand 0 1 0 1 1
Slovak Republic 0 1 0.226 0 1
Slovenia 0 1 0 1 1
United Kingdom 0 1 0 1 1
United States 0 1 0 1 1
Average 0.10395455 0.63636364 0.04959091 0.86363636 0.95454545
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Table 5: Results of the Granger causality between economic growth rate and lending 
interest, 1987-2012
   Dependent: ctopib, independent: int
Dependent: int, 
independent: ctopib
Country obs p-value Reject? p-value Reject? At least one reject
Australia 26 0.685 0 0.004 1 1
Austria 23 0.051 1 0 1 1
Bulgaria 20 0.376 0 0.717 0 0
Canada 26 0.025 1 0.007 1 1
Chile 26 0 1 0.025 1 1
Czech Republic 18 0.416 0 0.094 1 1
Denmark 16 0.021 1 0.295 0 1
Estonia 15 0.106 0 0.421 0 0
Finland 18 0 1 0.018 1 1
France 18 0.143 0 0.001 1 1
Germany 16 0.202 0 0 1 1
Greece 17 0.009 1 0.37 0 1
Hungary 19 0.014 1 0.105 0 1
Ireland 19 0.032 1 0.492 0 1
Iceland 26 0.174 0 0 1 1
Israel 26 0.878 0 0.208 0 0
Italy 26 0 1 0.046 1 1
Japan 26 0.453 0 0.018 1 1
Korea 26 0.003 1 0 1 1
Luxembourg 12 0.215 0 0 1 1
Latvia 18 0.601 0 0.002 1 1
Mexico 18 0.41 0 0.188 0 0
Lithuania 16 0.459 0 0.384 0 0
Netherlands 26 0.086 1 0.256 0 1
New Zaeland 12 0.118 0 0.001 1 1
Norway 23 0 1 0.368 0 1
Poland 14 0.197 0 0.359 0 0
Portugal 13 0.494 0 0.267 0 0
Slovak Republic 14 0.025 1 0.025 1 1
Slovenia 12 0.898 0 0.397 0 0
Spain 16 0.54 0 0.014 1 1
Sweden 19 0 1 0.331 0 1
United Kingdom 26 0.008 1 0.001 1 1
United States 26 0.692 0 0.007 1 1
Average 672 0.24502941 0.44117647 0.15944118 0.55882353 0.76470588
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Country p-value Reject? p-value Reject? At least one
Australia 0 1 0 1 1
Belgium 0 1 0.136 0 1
Bulgaria 0.011 1 0.845 0 1
Canada 0.008 1 0 1 1
Chile 0 1 0 1 1
Czech Republic 0.017 1 0.21 0 1
Estonia 0 1 0 1 1
Hungary 0.002 1 0.068 1 1
Iceland 0 1 0 1 1
Israel 0.068 1 0 1 1
Italy 0 1 0.065 1 1
Japan 0 1 0 1 1
Korea 0.003 1 0 1 1
Latvia 0.006 1 0.014 1 1
Mexico 0 1 0.116 0 1
Lithuania 0.001 1 0.431 0 1
Netherlands 0.009 1 0.084 1 1
New Zaeland 0 1 0.138 0 1
Norway 0 1 0.437 0 1
Slovak Republic 0.273 0 0 1 1
Slovenia 0 1 0 1 1
United Kingdom 0 1 0.186 0 1
United States 0 1 0.13 0 1
Average 0.01730435 0.95652174 0.12434783 0.60869565 1
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Country p-value reject? p-value reject? Al menos 1
Australia 0 1 0 1 1
Austria 0 1 0 1 1
Belgium 0 1 0.726 0 1
Bulgaria 0.039 1 0 1 1
Canada 0 1 0.765 0 1
Chile 0 1 0 1 1
Czech Republic 0.032 1 0.068 1 1
Denmark 0.135 0 0.469 0 0
Estonia 0 1 0 1 1
Finland 0.895 0 0 1 1
France 0.022 1 0 1 1
Germany 0.421 0 0 1 1
Greece 0.285 0 0.055 1 1
Hungary 0.79 0 0 1 1
Ireland 0.011 1 0.01 1 1
Iceland 0 1 0.003 1 1
Israel 0 1 0 1 1
Italy 0.978 0 0 1 1
Japan 0.176 1 0.022 1 1
Korea 0 1 0 1 1
Luxembourg      
Latvia 0.004 1 0.579 0 1
Mexico 0.422 0 0 1 1
Lithuania 0.432 0 0 1 1
Netherlands 0.642 0 0 1 1
New Zealand 0.042 1 0 1 1
Norway      
Poland 0.085 1 0.042 1 1
Portugal 0.616 0 0 1 1
Slovak Republic 0.002 1 0 1 1
Slovenia 0 1 0.265 0 1
Spain 0 1 0.259 0 1
Sweden 0 1 0.641 0 1
Turkey 0 1 0 1 1
United Kingdom 0.021 1 0 1 1
United States 0.007 1 0 1 1
Average 0.17814706 0.70588235 0.11482353 0.79411765 0.97058824
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Country p-value reject? p-value reject? Al menos 1
Australia 0.292 0 0.711 0 0
Austria 0.305 0 0.571 0 0
Belgium 0.046 1 0.677 0 1
Bulgaria 0.065 1 0.35 0 1
Canada 0.059 1 0.104 0 1
Chile 0.054 1 0.756 0 1
Czech Republic 0.568 0 0.514 0 0
Denmark 0.074 1 0.301 0 1
Estonia 0.804 0 0.964 0 0
Finland 0.739 0 0.143 0 0
France 0.561 0 0.531 0 0
Germany 0.393 0 0.699 0 0
Greece 0.673 0 0.011 1 1
Hungary 0.251 0 0.227 0 0
Ireland 0.811 0 0.483 0 0
Iceland 0.014 1 0.888 0 1
Israel 0.532 0 0.24 0 0
Italy 0.725 0 0.827 0 0
Japan 0.001 1 0.773 0 1
Korea 0.147 0 0.594 0 0
Luxembourg 0.783 0 0.135 0 0
Latvia 0.903 0 0.141 0 0
Mexico 0.033 1 0.553 0 1
Lithuania 0.521 0 0.32 0 0
Netherlands 0.81 0 0.382 0 0
New Zealand 0.161 0 0.666 0 0
Norway 0.083 1 0.527 0 1
Poland 0.817 0 0.086 1 1
Portugal 0.737 0 0.397 0 0
Slovak Republic 0.75 0 0.006 0 0
Slovenia 0.788 0 0.551 0 0
Spain 0.634 0 0.088 1 1
Sweden 0.6 0 0.705 0 0
Turkey 0.616 0 0.41 0 0
United Kingdom 0.514 0 0.263 0 0
United States 0 1 0.088 1 1
Average 0.44066667 0.27777778 0.43561111 0.11111111 0.36111111
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